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ABSTRACT 
Global airline alliances enable member airlines to increase profits. They achieve 
this by increasing customer willingness to pay and reducing costs. Deep levels of 
partnerships are required to drive these benefits. The ability for partners to closely 
integrate is largely dependent on antitrust immunities being granted by regulators, which 
enable joint venture partnerships. The Oneworld alliance is poised to capitalize on a 
recent decision by the United States Department of Transportation and European Union 
Regulators to grant antitrust immunities between its two largest partners, American 
Airlines and British Airways. However, the Oneworld members must increase both their 
alliance‘s network size and the depth of partnerships if they are to optimize profits from 
their alliance. 
 
Keywords: Global Airline Industry; Alliances 
 
Subject Terms: Masters of Business Administration 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Global airline alliances enable their membership to increase profits. They 
accomplish this through increasing customer willingness to pay and by providing 
opportunities for members to reduce costs through operational efficiencies. These 
benefits might also occur through industry consolidation. However, the current regulatory 
environment rarely allows for cross-border mergers and acquisitions in the airline 
industry. Alliances are therefore an interim solution. Three major global airline alliances 
exist: Star Alliance, Skyteam and Oneworld. This paper examines the alliance strategy 
employed by the Oneworld partners. Their strategy has both strengths and weaknesses. 
The alliance has been very selective in its choice of partners, which has enabled the group 
to maintain a consistently high quality product and service level. However, the strategy 
has led to a relatively small network size. As a result, Oneworld has fallen behind the 
competition in terms of size of membership. Oneworld has also been less successful than 
the competition in driving deep integration between partners. Evidence suggests that 
these two factors may be affecting Oneworld‘s ability to increase profits through their 
alliance. The Oneworld partners must grow their alliances‘ network size and increase 
integration if the group is to optimize profits from its alliance. 
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1:  INTRODUCTION 
The Oneworld alliance is a strategic grouping of twelve international airlines. The 
membership consists of American Airlines, British Airways, Cathay Pacific Airways, 
Finnair, Iberia, Japan Airlines, LAN, Malév Hungarian Airlines, Mexicana, Qantas, 
Royal Jordanian and S7 Airlines. It is one of three global airline alliances; Star Alliance 
and Skyteam are its competitors. Global alliances have become an important component 
of the strategies of a growing number of international airlines, accounting for 55% of the 
world‘s international air traffic. The alliances are widely seen as an interim solution to 
widespread industry consolidation. They have formed due to a regulatory environment 
that rarely permits cross-border mergers between airlines. Foreign ownership restrictions 
often stipulate that a majority of voting stock and key management positions be held by 
citizens of that country. A primary reason for foreign ownership restrictions is the fact 
that airlines have historically been considered critical to a country‘s national security. 
Commercial aircraft are often ―conscripted‖ during times of war. Another reason is 
protectionism. Labour unions see foreign competition as a threat to job security. 
Alliances therefore offer an alternative for airlines to achieve some of the same 
advantages of mergers. This is important to an industry that lost a combined $US 47 
billion over the past ten years (Deutsche Bank report, p. 17-27).  
Alliance membership has grown substantially over the past decade. This leads to 
the presumption that member airlines are successful in deriving additional profits from 
their alliances. This paper seeks to understand the benefits that the Oneworld partner 
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airlines achieve from their alliance. The strategic analysis begins with a description of the 
Oneworld alliance (in chapter 2) and the airline industry landscape (in chapter 3). Chapter 
4 then looks at the economics of airline alliances. It demonstrates that alliances can 
benefit their membership in two ways. First, they enable partner airlines to increase 
customer willingness to pay. Second, they provide opportunities for members to operate 
more efficiently. This combination leads to incremental profits for partner airlines. 
Chapter 5 examines the specific alliance strategy adopted by the Oneworld partners. It 
looks at strengths and weaknesses of the strategy and identifies key threats the alliance is 
facing based on its positioning. Chapter 6 considers the most likely scenario for the 
Oneworld partners if the current strategy is maintained and industry trends continue. It 
concludes that the Oneworld partners will not be in a position to maximize profits 
through their alliance unless the grouping expands its alliance network through a more 
ambitious membership recruitment drive. Chapter 7 introduces several options for 
increasing the Oneworld alliance network size. Chapter 8 utilizes a multi-goal solution 
analysis to evaluate membership growth options. The resulting recommendation is that 
the Oneworld partners pursue membership expansion through recruitment of non-
traditional low cost carriers (this strategic group of airlines will be detailed in chapter 3) 
and through international mergers. The paper also recommends that the Oneworld 
partners look to increase the depth of integration between its members to ensure profits 
are maximized through their alliance. 
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2:  THE ONEWORLD ALLIANCE 
This chapter provides a description of the Oneworld airline alliance. It begins 
with an overview of the alliance‘s membership. It then details the governance structure of 
the alliance. 
2.1 Membership 
The Oneworld alliance is comprised of twelve member airlines. The current 
membership includes American Airlines (the United States), British Airways (The United 
Kingdom), Cathay Pacific Airways (Hong Kong), Finnair (Finland), Iberia (Spain), Japan 
Airlines (Japan), LAN (Chile), Malév Hungarian Airlines (Hungary), Mexicana 
(Mexico), Qantas (Australia), Royal Jordanian (Jordan) and S7 Airlines (Russia). Two 
new member airlines are also set to join: Kingfisher Airlines (India) and Air Berlin 
(Germany). The partners fly to 750 destinations in 150 countries. The membership also 
operates 550 airport departure lounges around the globe (source: Oneworld.com).  
2.2 Governance 
 The Oneworld Alliance has two tiers of governance. They are, in order of 
authority, a Governing Board and a Management Team. All other alliance groups report 
to these two tiers. 
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2.2.1 Oneworld Governing Board (oGB) 
The Governing Board holds the highest authority within the alliance. The group is 
comprised of one Chief Executive Officer from each Member Airline. The oGB is 
responsible for ultimate management of the Alliance. Key decisions include setting the 
Oneworld vision, and final approval of strategy, business plans, budget and membership 
decisions. 
2.2.2 Oneworld Management Team (oMT) 
The Management Team reports to the Governing Board. The oMT is comprised 
of senior managers from the alliance departments of each airline. It leads and approves 
overall strategy, business plans, headcount and budgets. The group is also responsible for 
evaluation of any potential new members and the resolution of any issues between 
members, prior to referral to the oGB. 
2.3 The Oneworld Management Company 
The Oneworld Management Company (oMC) is a company that was incorporated 
to coordinate alliance activities. It report into the oMT. No alliance groups report into 
oMC itself. oMC is primarily a project management office that facilitates the 
development of an annual business plan but is not empowered to set overall alliance 
strategy. Airline representatives on the oMT and oGB set strategy for the alliance, based 
on input from Airline Steering Groups (described below). oMC works with these groups 
to coordinate and guide preparation of business plans and budgets. 
oMC‘s head office is located in Vancouver, British Columbia. The alliance‘s 
members own oMC. Each partner airline contributes to an annual budget based on their 
  5 
proportional size. The size of each member is determined by a standard airline industry 
measured called Available Seat Kilometers
1
 (ASKs). American Airlines and British 
Airways, being the two largest partners, pay just under half of total alliance expenses. 
Japan Airlines, Cathay Pacific and Qantas are the three next largest partners. These five 
partners account for 85% of funding for the alliance. 
2.4 Airline Steering Groups 
Oneworld has established Airline Steering Groups to act as support for the 
alliance in achieving their goals (see appendix A for a list of Oneworld Groups). These 
Groups report to the oMT. They are responsible for their areas of expertise. 
Responsibilities include translating the Oneworld vision into achievable objectives 
through the annual business plan and budget. They must also provide appropriate 
resources, primarily in the form of their own airline staff with necessary expertise, to 
ensure delivery of the annual plan. 
2.5 Delivery Requirements Document 
Oneworld members must prove that they meet certain criteria prior to joining the 
alliance. Each recruit must meet a number of membership expectations, which are 
defined in a Delivery Requirements Document (DRD). Members must support the 
Oneworld brand and deliver the Oneworld customer benefits as outlined in this 
document. A number of automation system requirements are incorporated in the DRD, 
which must interface with other alliance partners. Examples of automation requirements 
                                                 
1
  Airline Seat Kilometers is common industry measure that multiplies the number of seats available on a 
flight by the number of kilometers flown. It therefore measures an airline's capacity for transporting 
passengers. For example, an aircraft configured to fly 100 seats flying 160 km would give the carrier 
16,000 ASKs for that particular flight. 
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include: data exchange for frequent flyer programs, and the ability to transfer baggage 
when a customer transfers from one partner airline to another. oMC, in conjunction with 
the oMT, is responsible for ensuring that each DRD is adhered to and each member 
continues to comply with the terms of the agreement. 
The DRD includes an underlying pledge to alliance customers. It states that each 
partner‘s top tier2 frequent flyers will be treated with the same care, regardless of which 
member airline they fly on. This means that each member airline should treat any 
partner‘s top tier passenger as they would their own. For example, top tier customers 
should be able to access any partner airline‘s lounge in any given airport, if travelling on 
an eligible Oneworld flight. The alliance does not have a its own frequent flyer program. 
Each individual airline maintains their own program. However, Oneworld does have a set 
of gemstone classes (Ruby, Sapphire and Emerald), which correspond to the partner 
airline frequent flyer programs. These gemstones are included on the frequent flyer cards 
of each member airline to indicate the level of alliance recognition (see appendix B for a 
summary of Oneworld gemstones and alliance benefits). An example of an alliance 
benefit is access to any lounge operated by a oneworld partner airline within any airport 
across the globe. Passengers also earn frequent flyer currency when travelling within the 
alliance network. A British Airways Gold cardholder would therefore collect miles in his 
or her account when travelling on an American Airlines flight from Dallas to New York. 
The traveller would also earn points toward achieving Gold level tier status for their 
annual membership. Like all other DRD requirements, audits are conducted on an annual 
                                                 
2
  A top tier passenger is any customer that has achieved status recognition in an airline‘s frequent flyer 
program. This is generally accomplished by flying a significant number of flights on an annual basis.  
  7 
basis to ensure members are providing other alliance partners customers with the 
necessary frequent flyer benefits. 
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3:  THE INDUSTRY LANDSCAPE 
This chapter provides a description of the airline industry. It begins with a look at 
the industry‘s customers. It then explains how three distinct types of airline business 
models have evolved to cater to diverse customer needs (network airlines, low cost 
carriers and super connecting carriers). It seeks to demonstrate that partnerships are an 
important element of the industry. The chapter concludes with a description of various 
partnerships, beginning with minimal cooperation and extending to joint ventures and full 
mergers. 
3.1 Industry Customers 
The customer base for passenger airlines is very diverse. A passenger who travels 
on Southwest Airlines twice a year is a very different customer than an Executive 
Platinum cardholder in American Airline‘s AAdvantage program. The Southwest 
passengers could be a family that travels once a year on an annual vacation, whereas the 
American Airlines passenger may fly for business several times a month. Passengers who 
are flying on company business are known as corporate travellers. They generally travel 
at the expense of their employer. The corporate traveller comprises a small percentage of 
total passengers but accounts for a significant portion of total revenues. For example, A 
Singapore Airlines estimates that passengers in premium cabins, which are primarily 
corporate travellers, accounts for approximately 40 percent of their revenue 
(eTurboNews, May 2009). Passenger who are not travelling on business, typically for 
vacations, are leisure passengers. Leisure passengers are far more price sensitive than 
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corporate travellers. Corporate travellers are often willing to pay more for added service 
benefits. Airlines therefore provide several cabins of service to cater to varied customer 
demands. For example, customers purchasing a ticket on a British Airways long haul 
international flight can choose from four cabins: Economy Class, Premium Economy, 
Business Class or First Class. Table 1 provides an example of pricing on a one-way 
British Airways flight from Vancouver to London (in Canadian dollars, excluding taxes, 
fees, charges and surcharges, on May 13, 2011). 
Table 1: Example of British Airways fares from Vancouver to London 
 
Economy 
Premium 
Economy Business First 
Vancouver -London  $ 462 $903 $ 2,169 $ 6,591 
Source: www.ba.com 
This example illustrates that the pricing for each cabin varies significantly. Customers 
who travel in Business and First Class cabins are often corporate travellers. Leisure 
passengers typically book the lower fares in Economy class. 
3.2 Passenger Airline Types 
Three distinct business models have emerged to cater to the varied industry 
customer base: 1) network airlines, 2) low cost carriers and 3) super connecting carriers. 
The following section provides a description of each business model.   
3.2.1 Network Airlines 
The first grouping is network airlines. These carriers often originated as national 
airlines, operated as government businesses. They are the flag carrier of their home 
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country, given their origins as regulated businesses. A legacy of being state run is often 
that these organizations are left with high cost structures, old technology systems and 
long supply chains that involve a wide range of intermediaries. Network airlines also tend 
to have high employee costs due to seniority of service amongst pilots, cabin crew and 
other employee groups. Network airlines often rely heavily on revenue from passengers 
in their business and first class cabins to drive profits.  
Another distinguishing characteristic of network airlines is the hub and spoke 
business model. A majority of network airlines employ this strategy. It began in the 
1980s when deregulated US passenger airlines looked to copy the FedEx hub-and-spoke 
system. The model assumes it is more efficient to fly passengers via large hub airports 
rather than taking them straight to their destination, as Fed Ex
3
 does with their parcels 
(SRI International, p. 80-82). The model therefore relies on ‗feeder‘ flights to deliver 
passengers into the hub. Passengers then connect onto a wide range of destinations. This 
enables network airlines to more fully utilize relatively large airplanes and lower their 
average cost per passenger. An example of a traditional legacy carrier is American 
Airlines (AA). AA began as one of the major regulated airlines in the United States. It is 
now a de-regulated airline with five ‗cornerstone‘ hubs across the United States: Dallas, 
New York, Chicago, Los Angeles and Miami. The airline operates both domestically and 
internationally, with an increasingly strong emphasis on long haul international routes. 
3.2.2 Low Cost Carriers (LCCs) 
The second type of airline is the low cost carrier (LCC). These newer companies 
operate from a lean cost base. The business model removes a number of complexities 
                                                 
3
 Fed Ex is a cargo airline and courier delivery company ( www.fedex.com). 
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generally associated with network airlines. LCCs generally offer only one cabin of 
service – economy class. They also often utilize secondary airports (for example, an LCC 
may choose to operate out of Luton Airport in Great Britain, rather than London 
Heathrow). The benefit is that take off and landing fees are significantly lower from the 
secondary airport. It is also common for LCCs to operate a single fleet type. This delivers 
significant cost savings through the relative simplicity of training crews and maintaining 
one type of aircraft. A final important characteristic is flying point-to-point. LCCs tend to 
fly routes directly, thus avoiding the complexities of transferring large volumes of 
passengers from one airplane to another. This is the opposite of a hub-and-spoke network 
strategy. The simplicity of the business model enables LCCs to better utilize their 
aircraft. They accomplish this by having shorter turnaround times. Southwest Airlines is 
an excellent example of an LCC. The airline primarily operates a single fleet type of 
Boeing 737s, with one cabin of service, often from secondary airports (for example, their 
hub is located in Dallas Love Field, rather than Dallas Fort Worth), has a very low cost 
base and runs a very efficient and profitable operation (Govindarajan and Lang, July 
2002). 
3.2.3 Super-Connecting Carriers (SCCs) 
The last category of airline is the super-connecting carriers (SCC). The 
Economist magazine coined this term, in a 2010 profile of Emirates, Etihad Airlines and 
Qatar Airways. These three airlines are located in the United Arab of Emirates (UAE). 
Their business model requires the operation of large, long-range aircraft from 
strategically located hub airports in the Middle East. Each airline flies a wide-range of 
non-stop routes. They have exceptional customer service in their business and first class 
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cabins, which makes the product very attractive to passengers who are travelling on 
business. Emirates, Etihad and Qatar Airways operate from lower cost bases than 
traditional network airlines. There are two key areas of cost savings: lower employee and 
airport costs. Emirates is the best example of an SCC. It combines an excellent product 
with a low cost base and has a flexible, highly productive workforce. Most cabin crew 
and ancillary staff are from the Indian subcontinent and South-East Asia and are paid 
relatively low wages for the industry. Emirates‘ employees do not pay income tax, the 
same as all other workers in Dubai, which means salaries can be much lower than their 
European and American rivals. The net result is staff costs are around 15% of overhead, 
against well over twice that for a typical network airline (The Economist, June 2010).  
3.3 Airline Partnership Levels 
A majority of network airlines have come to rely on partnerships with other 
carriers to extend their networks. Relatively few pairs of cities have enough customer 
traffic to sustain the need for a daily flight. Carriers therefore seek commercial partners 
that can help them provide greater network coverage and increased service options (US 
DOT-EU report, p. 4). These can be bilateral relationships, between two partners, or 
multilateral alliances amongst a larger grouping of partners. The level of partnerships 
varies. The chart in Figure 1, developed by the United States Department of 
Transportation (DOT) and European Union regulators (EU), provides a visual 
representation of the partnership spectrum. This spectrum can be summarized in four 
categories (from low to high): 1) interline and codeshare agreements, 2) immunized 
partnerships, 3) joint businesses and 4) full mergers. 
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Figure 1: Spectrum of airline partnerships 
 
Source: US DOT-EU report on alliances 
3.3.1 Interlining and Codeshare Agreements 
Interlining and codeshare agreements are prominent in the airline industry. An 
interline agreement is a voluntary commercial agreement between airlines that facilitates 
passenger travel on itineraries involving multiple carriers. A typical agreement accounts 
for ticketing, baggage transfers, and other related services. Thousands of interline 
agreements exist between airlines globally (Deutsche Bank report, p. 28). However, these 
relationships have been superseded by more comprehensive codesharing partnerships. A 
codeshare agreement is a business arrangement where two airlines share the same flight. 
The agreement allows for seats on a flight operated by one carrier to be marketed and 
sold by another carrier under its two-letter designator code. A seat is purchased on one 
airline but is actually operated by another partner. Codesharing allows an airline to 
provide their customers with access to cities without having to offer extra flights 
(Wikipedia, March 2011). This level of relationship does not require alliance 
membership. It is practiced between both allied and non-allied airlines. However, the 
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global alliances play a significant role in driving airline interline and codeshare 
partnerships. Alliance members tend to keep passengers ‗within the family‘ by feeding 
traffic onto their alliance partner flights before non-alliance flights. This is because 
allied-airlines tend to favour alliance partners in the financial terms of their interlining 
and code-sharing agreements (DOT-EU report, p. 8). It is therefore important to 
distinguish between two distinct opportunities for partnerships. The first is within-
alliance partnerships. The second is the total number of partnership opportunities for an 
airline to interline with. The size of an airline‘s alliance has a direct impact on both 
opportunity areas. As more airlines join global alliances it creates opportunities for 
increased cooperation within that alliance, while simultaneously reducing the opportunity 
for airlines outside of that alliance to partner with the newly allied airlines. Again, this is 
due to the fact that allied airlines tend to favour interline partnerships with their alliance 
partners.   
3.3.2 Immunized Partnerships 
Immunized partnerships refer to airlines that have been granted immunities from 
antitrust laws by regulatory bodies on specific routes. United States antitrust law is a 
body of laws that prohibits anti-competitive behaviour and unfair business practices. 
Antitrust laws are intended to encourage competition in the marketplace. These laws 
make practices illegal if they are deemed to hurt consumers. Governments have 
competition regulators that apply the antitrust laws in order to prevent market failure. 
Other countries use the term ‗competition law‘, including the European Union (EU), 
which also has a wide body of competition regulations (Wikipedia, 2011). In recent 
years, government regulators within the United States and EU have granted a number of 
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airline partners ‗antitrust immunity‘ (ATI). This allows partner airlines to explicitly 
collude on specified routes. It is essentially permission, granted by government 
regulators, for airlines to work together in ways that would otherwise be anti-competitive 
and illegal.  
The argument for granting ATI is complicated but can be attributed largely to 
downward pressures these partnerships place on airfares (the concepts will be covered in 
detail in Chapter 4: The Economics of Airline Alliances). The appeal of ATI to airlines 
arises from several sources. For example, by coordinating flight schedules and ensuring 
gate proximity at connecting airports, alliance partners can offer greater convenience to 
passengers. Alliance travel thus resembles single-airline service, avoiding many of the 
inconveniences of a traditional trip that requires a transfer between two airlines 
(Brueckner and Whalen, p. 504). This type of activity, involving coordinating flight 
schedules between two competitive airlines, would otherwise be deemed illegal by 
Federal authorities, thus the need for immunities to be granted. ATI also enables partner 
airlines to coordinate efforts in sales, marketing, product alignment and other areas of 
mutual benefit. 
3.3.3 Joint Businesses (JBs) 
The formation of a joint business (JB) is dependent on immunized partnerships. It 
takes the level of integration a significant step forward by creating an environment where 
partner airlines share revenue on particular routes. This means that the airlines involved 
in the JB are indifferent as to which aircraft carries a passenger (Deutsche Bank report, p. 
28). The reason for this is that revenues are pooled on the affected routes and shared 
across the JB partners based on an agreed percentage formula. This form of cooperation 
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is a close substitute to a merger as it involves full coordination of major airline functions, 
including scheduling, pricing, revenue management, marketing, and sales (US DOT-EU 
report, p. 7). Integrated JBs provide a strong incentive to cooperate because individual 
carriers no longer seek to maximise their own revenue, but rather the revenue of the 
network. However, JBs with revenue sharing agreements are complicated to set up and 
are therefore not practiced by all airlines that enjoy ATI partnerships. 
A good example of a JB exists between Oneworld partners American Airlines 
(AA), British Airways (BA) and Iberia (IB). The three partners created a common 
business on transatlantic routes in October 2010. Revenues on all flights from the United 
States to Europe (and vice-versa) are now shared among the partners. AA, BA and IB 
therefore no longer compete for customers on these routes, which account for over 20% 
of Oneworld‘s international traffic (OAG reports, March 2010). In a recent interview for 
Airline Leader magazine, BA‘s CEO, Willy Walsh explained how efforts are now 
coordinated to attract travellers. ―A key part of the revenue sharing agreement is our 
ability to sell seats on each other‘s flights,‖ said Mr Walsh. ―This wider cooperation and 
support will enable us to operate routes that would not be viable if we could only sell to 
our individual airline‘s customer base. British Airways will start flights from Heathrow 
Terminal 5 to San Diego in June next year. Connoisseurs of the BA route network may 
know that this is the third time that we have launched this particular route. I think that 
serves to highlight the benefits of the joint business – the route did not deliver a profitable 
return for BA in isolation but we are extremely confident that, by working together with 
our colleagues, it will.‖ (Airline Leader, p. 12). 
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3.3.4 Mergers 
The final level of partnership is a merger between two airlines. Airline mergers 
and acquisitions have historically been largely confined to domestic markets. This has 
been caused by widespread regulatory restrictions on foreign ownership of airlines. Over 
the past two decades a number of events have occurred that are changing restrictive 
aviation regulations, including 1) the introduction of ―Open Skies‖ agreements, which 
significantly reduce government regulations in the industry and allows foreign airlines to 
operate freely between countries; 2) creation of a common aviation marketplace and 
regulatory regime for the entire European Union; 3) antitrust immunities granted to 
airline partners by the US Department of Transportation and other regulatory bodies; and 
4) relaxation of foreign ownership restrictions in a number of countries, often in an 
attempt to attract foreign financing for airlines in financial distress (Deutsche Bank 
report, p. 2). These events are creating a regulatory environment that will likely be more 
welcoming to cross border airline mergers in the future. 
3.4 Summary of Industry Landscape 
Three strategic groups of airlines were discussed in this chapter: network airlines, 
low cost carriers and super connecting carriers. The strategies for each are tailored to 
meet the needs of a varied industry customer base. One characteristic, common to many 
airlines, is the need to offer its customer base access to a wide ranging network. 
Regulatory restrictions and commercial realities make it impossible for any one airline to 
provide services around the globe. Airlines therefore rely on partnerships to extend their 
network. The level of partnerships varies in depth. Partners in global alliances are 
increasingly deepening their level of cooperation and moving towards joint business 
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relationships. This level of integration leads alliance partners to become indifferent as to 
which flights the customer chooses, as all revenues are shared. These alliances are as 
close to a merger as possible within the current regulatory environment. 
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4:  ECONOMICS OF AIRLINE ALLIANCES  
The economics of airline alliances are detailed in this chapter. It explains how 
airlines can utilize alliances to increase profits. They accomplish this by 1) improving 
pricing, 2) reducing costs, 3) increasing customer willingness to pay and 4) reducing 
industry rivalry. The following section examines these impacts and how each results in 
increased value created and captured for alliance member airlines. 
4.1 Improving pricing 
The first impact of alliances on airfares is to create value by establishing better 
pricing for customers when two airlines partner to create an interline fare. This is 
accomplished through the removal of double marginalization. Double marginalization 
occurs when the fares of two non-allied airlines are combined to form a customer 
journey. In these cases there is no coordination between the two parties. The two airfares 
are determined independently. Each carrier chooses a sub-fare for its portion of the 
interline trip. If no cooperative price setting mechanism is in place, each carrier will set 
its sub-fare to maximize its own profit. The result is each carrier charges a sub-fare that is 
a mark up on the marginal cost for profit maximization. Since there is no coordination of 
these mark ups, the combined total fare will therefore not maximize the joint profits of 
the two carriers. This is not in the best interest of the airlines or their customers. Airlines 
within alliances therefore adopt cooperative pricing mechanisms that result in sharing of 
revenue arising from interline traffic. The carriers work together to set interline fare 
levels that maximize their joint profits (Zou, Oum, Yu, p. 320). Double marginalization is 
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therefore eliminated, which leads to downward pressure on interline fares, increasing 
value created. As well, more value is captured by airlines as profits.  
4.2 Reducing costs 
Alliances enable member airline to reduce costs. They do this in a number of 
ways. The first is through increasing economies of traffic density. These economies 
emerge when airlines are able to lower their per passenger costs by increasing the number 
of passengers carried on their existing network. This phenomena was first observed in 
studies of hub-and-spoke airport models. Airlines adopted hub-and-spoke strategies in an 
effort to feed passengers from regional airports through their hubs. This funnelling of 
passengers through airports raised traffic densities and enabled carriers to reduce their 
costs by operating larger, more efficient aircraft with increased load factors
4
, which 
reduces average cost per passenger (Brueckner & Whalen, p. 506). This phenomena is 
accelerated by global airline alliances. When a large group of airlines cooperate by 
joining their respective feeder flows, the partnerships create a larger pool of customers 
and cost savings are realized by carrying additional passengers on an airlines‘ existing 
flights (US DOT-EU report, p. 21). The growth of alliance networks can be understood as 
an attempt to exploit economies of traffic density, under which the marginal cost of 
carrying an extra passenger on a route falls as traffic on the route rises (Brueckner & 
Spiller, p. 380). Economies of traffic density therefore reduces costs and increases value 
created. 
                                                 
4
  Load factor measures the percentage of the total available seats of an airplane that are filled during a 
flight. 
  21 
Alliance partnerships can also drive significant asset efficiency. A good example 
comes from two Oneworld alliance partners. British Airways and American Airlines 
recently announced a joint New York-London schedule for the spring of 2011. The 
partners have worked together to spread out their flight times. Flights that used to be 
bunched together are now spread apart. Customers are offered a flight departing every 
hour from New York City to London Heathrow. By cutting overlapping flights, only 11 
daily flights are offered instead of 12. The partners are therefore creating more revenue, 
and providing a better customer service, with 10% less aircraft required (Deutsche Bank 
Report, p. 34). It is important to recognize that the ability for airlines to coordinate 
schedules on competitive routes is dependent on ATI being granted. The schedule 
alignment between British Airways and American Airlines would have been deemed as 
collusive had the two partners not been immunized across the Trans-Atlantic by UK and 
US regulatory authorities.  
A second example involving British Airways shows the importance of ATI. 
Figure 2 shows Air France-KLM‘s load factor following the creation of their immunized 
joint business in 2004. The load factors rose faster for these two partners than they did for 
British Airways over the same period. Air France-KLM accomplished this by cutting 
duplication on routes while offering more frequency of flights to the customer (Deutsche 
Bank report, p. 35). British Airways can expect to see a similar result from the joint 
business they have established with their Spanish partner, Iberia, in October 2010. It is 
likely that the two airlines will witness a similar spike in load factors in 2011, when the 
benefits of their cooperation on scheduling take effect. This again illustrates the fact that 
the creation of alliances is not, in and of itself, enough to generate benefits from 
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membership. These benefits can only be achieved through deep alliance partnerships, 
often only after ATI has been granted. 
Figure 2: Impact of Airfrance/KLM merger on load factors 
 
Source: Deutsche Bank report (2010) 
Alliance partnerships also open opportunities for shared facilities. For example, 
American Airlines, British Airways and Iberia recently announced the opening of their 
first joint airport lounge, in Miami. The new premium lounge is larger than any of the 
partner‘s previous lounges. The shared lounge enables the partners to share expensive 
airport real estate. The fact that airline flight times are varied throughout the course of the 
day means that the facility will be more efficiently utilized, as independently operated 
airline lounges often sit empty for large portions of the day when there are no departing 
flights. The net result is the sharing of significant costs and better capital asset utilization. 
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4.3 Increased customer willingness to pay 
Alliances enable airlines to create value through increasing the ability to raise 
fares for business travellers. They accomplish this through the existence of service 
premiums. Zou, Oum and Yu (2010) argue that alliances provide airlines with an 
enhanced ability to increase customer willingness to pay. These premiums are generated 
through benefits that customers value, such as enhanced connecting services, premium 
check-in, better schedule coordination and more convenient connections. These services 
are intended to make customer journeys that require a transfer between two airlines as 
seamless as possible. The analysis conducted by Zou, Oum and Yu showed that the 
impact of these service premiums varied for different customer groups. Not surprisingly, 
leisure travellers displayed a limited willingness to pay for service premiums. They 
typically choose the lowest available fare. However, customers that booked fares in first 
class and business class were often willing to pay more for flights operated by alliance 
partners. The study concluded that corporate travellers are less price-conscious and value 
services that create a more seamless journey. This enables allied-airlines to introduce 
service premiums. Increased willingness to pay increases value created.  
4.4 Reduction of rivalry 
A final impact of alliances on airfares is a reduction in rivalry. When airlines 
cooperate on routes there is less competition in the marketplace. This is particularly true 
when airlines operate joint businesses and align flight schedules. For example, 
procurement experts for global corporations have suggested that the growing dominance 
of transatlantic alliances has fundamentally changed how airlines sell services to 
corporate travel buyers. Antitrust immunities have converted nearly a dozen distinct 
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competitors into three dominant entities (Star Alliance, Skyteam and Oneworld). This 
concentration of supplier power reduces corporate buyers‘ negotiating leverage. In a 2010 
forecast, Bob Brindley, a vice president at Advido
5
, identified transatlantic joint 
businesses as a top concern for corporate buyers. He said that "the deals bring them (the 
customer) no benefits, with the discount from the whole being less than discounts 
previously offered separately by individual members of the joint venture. Worse still, 
there is evidence that joint ventures are using their newfound power to insist they are 
awarded city pairs currently operated by competitors" (Boehmer, March 2010). The 
impact of reduced rivalry within the industry is increased value captured by the airlines. 
4.5 Summary of Alliance Economics 
Alliances enable airlines to create and capture value in four ways. They enable 
airlines to improve pricing, reduce costs, increase customer willingness to pay and reduce 
industry rivalry. However, these benefits do not appear to be uniform across the alliances. 
The study conducted by Zou, Oum and Yu in 2010 looked at variances between the three 
alliance groupings. It showed that member airlines of Star Alliance and Skyteam were 
able to charge 14% higher premiums for their interline fares than those of non-allied 
itineraries. This effect was not witnessed for interline fares offered by the Oneworld 
Alliance. Their analysis showed that Oneworld partners were not able to charge 
premiums on their interline fares. There are a number of reasons why this may have 
occurred. For example, the Oneworld partners may have been less successful in reducing 
industry rivalry on the affected routes. However, Zou, Oum and Yu attributed the result 
to the fact that service benefits are not achieved by simply having an alliance relationship 
                                                 
5
 Advido is a supplier of global corporate travel management services based in Dallas, Texas. 
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in place. They are dependent on well-coordinated integration and full cooperation (Zou, 
Oum and Yu, p. 328). Oneworld‘s inability to extract service premiums may therefore be 
a result of less alliance integration, relative to the other alliances. 
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5:  ONEWORLD‟S STRATEGIC POSITIONING 
This chapter describes the strategic position of the Oneworld Alliance. It 
identifies both strengths and weaknesses of the alliance strategy. The chapter concludes 
by introducing external threats that Oneworld is facing, including: 1) the continued 
growth of LCCs, 2) the continued emergence of SCCs and 3) the fact that Oneworld‘s 
network is sparse within key growth regions for air travel. 
5.1 Strengths of Oneworld‟s current position 
The strength of the Oneworld alliance strategy rests on three fundamentals. First, 
the alliance‘s selective approach to membership has enabled it to maintain a high, 
consistent standard for products and services delivered by its member airlines. Second, 
the alliance is well positioned at four of the world‘s ten leading premium airports. Third, 
Oneworld‘s joint business between American Airlines, British Airways and Iberia on the 
North Atlantic provides an opportunity to coordinate efforts on the world‘s premier 
business travel route; New York‘s John F. Kennedy Airport (JFK) to London Heathrow 
(LHR). 
5.1.1 Consistency of Product Offering 
The Oneworld alliance partners have been very selective in extending invitations 
to new members. The group has positioned itself as the quality airline alliance by strictly 
adhering to the membership standards defined in the alliance Delivery Requirements 
Document. This has resulted in Oneworld being consistently recognized as the industry 
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leader for high quality partners. Oneworld‘s performance in various industry awards 
reflects this fact. The group won three prestigious best airline alliance awards in 2010, 
including: Global Traveller‘s Best Airline Alliance, World Travel Awards' Leading 
Airline Alliance and World Airline Awards' Best Airline Alliance (Oneworld Website, 
May 2011). Speaking at the 2010 World Airline Awards, Oneworld Vice-President 
Corporate Affairs Michael Blunt said, "Oneworld aspires to be the world‘s premier 
alliance, so we are thrilled to be judged the best by the people who really count - 
customers - in the biggest ever independent survey of international air travellers‖ 
(Skytrax World Airline Awards, May 2011).  
5.1.2 Strength at Key „Premium‟ Hub Airports 
The Oneworld airlines are currently placed well in a number of the world‘s 
‗premium‘ hub airports. Premium hubs are determined by the capacity of business and 
first class seats that airlines fly to and from an airport. Figure 3 provides a summary of 
the top 10 premium airports in 2010. Oneworld is currently entrenched at four of these 
important hubs for business travellers. London Heathrow, Hong Kong, Tokyo Narita and 
New York JFK, via British Airways, Cathay Pacific, Japan Airlines and American 
Airlines, respectively. These four airports account for 45% of the world‘s total premium 
seats (Airline Leader report, p. 48). While Oneworld may not be the largest alliance, it is 
very competitive against the other alliances in those locations where premium business 
passengers travel most frequently. 
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Figure 3: Top ten premium airports 
 
Source: Airline Leader report, 2010 
5.1.3 North Atlantic Joint Business 
Oneworld now has Anti-Trust Immunity (ATI) between its two largest partners on 
its most important routes. The announcement that US regulators had granted ATI 
between American Airlines and British Airways on transatlantic routes in October 2010 
was likely the most important event in Oneworld‘s history. The immunity was also 
extended to three other Oneworld partners: Finnair, Iberia and Royal Jordanian. The 
granting of this immunity was followed shortly after by the announcement that American 
Airlines, British Airways and Iberia would form their Joint Business (JB) on the North 
Atlantic. This JB includes a full revenue sharing agreement. All tickets sold to customers 
for flights from the United States to Europe are now pooled amongst the three partner 
airlines and distributed based on an agreed percentage formula. These routes account for 
over 25% of Oneworld‘s network6 (OAG report, May 2011). The group‘s ability to 
deepen relationships opens potential for the partners to drive significant integration. For 
                                                 
6
  OAG is a company that provides reporting tools for the airline industry. This measure is based on the 
total number of seats that are flown by the Oneworld partners across their airplane fleets.  
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example, the alignment of American Airlines and British Airways schedules means the 
partners now offer an hourly flights between New York JFK and London Heathrow. The 
joint business partners are also creating transfer support centres at Miami, New York, 
London Heathrow and Madrid. These transfer centres have been established to take care 
of passengers who have little time to make it to their next flight when transferring 
between the three airlines. Employees from the three companies staff the transfer centres. 
Their first role is to identify flights that have passengers on board with tight connection 
times. These passengers are then met at the aircraft by customer-service staff who ensure 
passengers catch their flights or rebook them on the next available flight if connections 
have been missed. This significantly enhances the customer and baggage transfer 
proposition amongst the alliance partners (Airline Leader, p. 13). Schedule alignment and 
the creation of Oneworld transfer centres are strong examples of deep alliance integration 
that increase value for both the airline members and customers.  
5.2 Weaknesses of Oneworld‟s current position 
The strategy of the Oneworld partners has created an alliance with a grouping of 
high quality partners who are well positioned in premium airports where business 
travellers travel most frequently. However, the strategy has left the Oneworld partners 
with two important weaknesses: 1) the alliance has a relatively small network, in 
comparison to Star and Skyteam and 2) the Oneworld partners are not as integrated as the 
other alliances.  
  30 
5.2.1 Smaller Network 
Oneworld is the smallest of the three alliances at 10.4% of total industry flights. 
Table 2 provides a summary of total alliance flights in March 2010 and March 2011. The 
small size of Oneworld‘s network leads to three concerns: 1) reduced economies of 
traffic density, 2) reduced options for interline partnership opportunities due to the fact 
that airlines in other alliances prioritize partnerships with their Star Alliance or Skyteam 
partners and 3) less ability to eliminate industry rivalry. 
Table 2: Number of flights operated by alliance airlines in March 2010 & 2011 
 
Source: OAG data 
The first issue created by Oneworld‘s smaller network is reduced economies of 
traffic density. Chapter 4 explained the economics of airline alliances and the advantages 
economies of traffic density provide network airlines. Higher levels of customer traffic 
funnelled through hub airports enables airlines to reduce their cost per passenger through 
the utilization of larger aircraft and increased load factors. The fact that Oneworld has a 
relatively small network will inevitably result in less traffic flowing through their hub 
airports. 
A second issue will compound this problem for Oneworld. Alliance members tend 
to keep passengers within-the-family by feeding traffic onto their alliance partner flights 
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before non-alliance flights. This is because allied-airlines tend to favour alliance partners 
in the financial terms of their interlining and code-sharing agreements (DOT-EU report, 
p. 8). This leaves Oneworld in a weak position. Star Alliance now has 26% of the world‘s 
ASKs in their network. That means that more than a quarter of the airlines across the 
globe will be more likely to transfer their passengers onto their Star Alliance partners 
before they consider interlining with Oneworld members. The end result will be less 
opportunities for Oneworld partners to establish interline partnerships that could 
otherwise assist in driving up load factors on their flights.  
The last issue Oneworld faces due to a smaller network size relates to less 
opportunities to reduce industry rivalry. The creation of alliance partnerships on 
competitive routes naturally reduces competition. This is particularly true when 
immunized relationships and joint business exist. For example, ATI approvals and the 
subsequent creation of JBs have converted nearly a dozen distinct competitors into three 
dominant entities on transatlantic routes (Star Alliance, Skyteam and Oneworld). Each of 
these groupings is now pooling revenues on these routes and coordinating schedules. 
While Oneworld has a strong position on the Transatlantic, it is less well positioned to 
remove rivalry in regions such as Europe and Asia, due its relatively small group of 
members. Less partnerships within the grouping inevitably means less opportunity to 
reduce rivalry.  
5.2.2 Less Integration 
In addition to having a smaller alliance network, Oneworld is less integrated than 
its competitors. Star and Skyteam have been more effective in deepening partnerships 
within their alliances. This was raised by Zou, Oum and Yu (2010) as a potential 
  32 
explanation for Oneworld‘s inability to extract service premiums from business 
travellers. Their empirical evidence showed that business travellers were willing to pay 
significantly higher fares on interline journeys serviced by two Star Alliance or Skyteam 
members. However, the results for Oneworld members did not show any price mark-up 
for allied-interline services. One explanation for this may be a competitive disadvantage 
that Oneworld faced against the competition for the past several years. Meaningful 
alliance integration often requires the existence of ATI between key partners. Oneworld 
has been significantly behind the competition in receiving approvals. Figure 4 
summarizes immunities between alliance partners prior to October 2010. Oneworld‘s 
lack of anti-trust immunities largely prevented the partners from working together in 
schedule alignment, joint marketing and other areas that require regulatory immunities. 
This put Oneworld at a distinct disadvantage versus Star Alliance and Skyteam. 
Oneworld has since received ATI amongst several other partners (this will be covered in 
Chapter 6). However, the benefits derived from these immunities would not have been 
available to Oneworld at the time of Zou, Oum and Yu‘s 2010 research. The evidence 
therefore suggests that, at least as of 2010, Oneworld is behind the competition in terms 
of deep integration between partners. 
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Figure 4: ATI between alliance partners prior to October 2010 
 
Source: Author 
5.3 External Threats 
The Oneworld alliance partners face a number of areas of concern moving 
forward. The following section identifies three major threats to Oneworld: 1) the 
continued growth of low cost carriers, 2) the emergence of super connecting carriers and 
3) the fact that Oneworld is not well positioned in emerging markets. 
5.3.1 Growth of LCCs 
Low cost carriers (LCCs) have rapidly increased market share over the past two 
decades. LCCs now account for 23% of global airline capacity, compared to only 8% in 
2001 (CAPA article, March 2011). Network airlines have increasingly focussed on long-
haul international routes, unable to compete with the low cost base of these new 
generation airlines. Studies have shown that LCCs typically extend their market share to 
approximately 30 percent before reaching a ceiling (Gillen, p. 17). This has occurred in 
North America, Europe and Asia. A possible explanation may be that LCCs first attract 
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passengers disenchanted with the traditional network airline. After that point, they work 
to steal non-typical passengers. They do this by altering their business models. For 
example, LCCs are now increasingly gaining market share at primary airports, rather than 
being content operating from secondary airports, which tend to cater more to leisure 
passengers. Easyjet is now the largest short-haul carrier at London Gatwick and has 
become the second largest carrier at Paris Charles de Gaulle (Gillen, p. 17). A major 
presence at these primary airports raises costs for Easyjet but enables it to compete for 
lucrative business travellers. The danger for the Oneworld partners is that LCCs have 
reached their natural ceiling and are still looking for growth. They are increasingly 
looking toward business travellers, the typical network airline and alliance customer. 
5.3.2 Growth of SCCs 
The emergence of super connecting carriers (SCCs) from the Middle East has 
been equally impressive. Emirates, Etihad, and Qatar Airways represent a rising threat to 
European network airlines. The SCCs have been growing rapidly. Figure 5 shows that 
Emirates Airlines has now surpassed British Airways in terms of passenger traffic. It is 
also on course to gain ground on Air France/KLM and Lufthansa, Europe‘s two largest 
network airlines. The problem for the Oneworld partners is that these trends are likely to 
continue. The SCCs have significantly lower costs, excellent products and service a wide-
range of destinations from their centrally located Middle Eastern hubs. Dubai, Abu 
Dhabi, and Doha are uniquely positioned on the globe, allowing for one-stop connections 
between major cities on six different continents (Deutsche Bank report, p. 80). This 
makes the SCCs a significant competitor for business travellers. 
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Figure 5: Comparison of Passenger Traffic 
 
Source: Deutsche Bank report 
5.3.3 Sparse Coverage in Key Growth Regions 
While Oneworld is currently well entrenched at a number of top premium 
airports, the alliance is not as well positioned moving forward. Airports in emerging 
markets are witnessing rapid growth. A recent report by the Centre for Pacific Aviation 
(CAPA) predicts the shape of the industry to be very different in ten years. The 
publication expects much greater representation of both Asia Pacific and Middle East 
hubs in the top thirty airports. In 2010, four of the top five fastest growing international 
markets were in Asia – China at 10.8%, the UAE at 10.2%, Vietnam at 10.2%, Malaysia 
at 10.1% and Sri Lanka at 9.5%. Announcing the forecast, IATA Director General and 
CEO Giovanni Bisignani said, ―The focus of the industry continues to shift eastward. By 
2014, one billion people will travel by air in Asia Pacific. That is 30% of the global total 
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and a 4 point increase from the 26% it represented in 2009‖ (CAPA Article, March 
2011).  
The largest problem Oneworld faces is that it is not positioned well in Asia. China 
will be by far the biggest contributor of new travellers in the future. Of the 800 million 
new travellers expected in 2014, 360 million (45%) will travel on Asia Pacific routes and, 
of those, 214 million will be associated with China (181 million domestic and 33 million 
international) (eTurbonews, February 2011). Figure 6 provides a summary of alliance 
market share in China. Oneworld has a relatively weak position in both Shanghai and 
Beijing, the two key aviation hubs within China. Skyteam is dominant in Beijing with 
their partners China Eastern and China Southern. Star Alliance is even more dominant in 
Beijing with their partner Air China. The three major Chinese airlines are therefore 
already members of the other alliances. This leaves Oneworld without a Chinese partner. 
Figure 6: Alliance market share in China
7
 
 
Source: MIDT (July 2008 - June 2009)  
                                                 
7
  These charts show the total amount of tickets that were booked on airlines within each alliance in both 
Shanghai (SHA) and Beijing (BJS) from July 2008 until June 2009. 
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5.4 Most Likely Outcome 
This chapter identified both strengths and weaknesses in the current positioning of 
the Oneworld alliance. The grouping has positioned itself as the quality airline alliance. 
Careful selection of membership has enabled the group to provide consistency in 
products and services. However, the group‘s relatively small network size leads to a 
number of disadvantages that will affect the ability to maximize profits through their 
alliance. The Oneworld alliance partners should be concerned that the total number of 
flights operated by its airlines was smaller in March 2010 than it was in March 2011 (as 
shown in Table 2). Oneworld‘s network size decreased by 3% over the period, while Star 
Alliance and Skyteam both grew their networks. The most likely outcome the Oneworld 
partners face moving forward is that their access to a wider customer base will continue 
to diminish if a new strategy is not adopted. This will result from two factors. First, the 
alliance is smaller than Star and Skyteam and will therefore have less opportunity for 
within alliance partnerships and for interline partnerships with non-allied airlines. As 
more airlines join the other alliances, it leaves less partnership opportunities available to 
the Oneworld airlines. As mentioned in chapter 3, allied-carriers tend to favour alliance 
partners for interlining and code-sharing agreements. This means that allied-airlines will 
often interline with their alliance partners before they look at partnerships with airlines in 
other alliances. This will be detrimental to the Oneworld partners as the pool of non-
allied airlines continues to shrink. Second, Oneworld is not well positioned in key growth 
markets. This is particularly true in China. This is a major concern given the trends of 
global travel expansion. If Oneworld is not successful in obtaining new members these 
negative trends will continue. 
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6:  SOLUTION ANALYSIS 
The previous chapter concluded with the most likely outcome for the Oneworld 
partners if industry trends continue and their alliance membership strategy does not 
change. Partnership opportunities for the Oneworld airlines will continue to diminish, 
while Star Alliance and Skyteam will continue to grow their opportunities. Oneworld will 
therefore be left with a relatively small group of airlines with which to grow partnerships. 
This will reduce the ability for the members to create and capture value through interline 
agreements and alliance relationships. It is therefore likely Oneworld will continue to see 
its total number of annual flights decrease year-on-year. If this trend is to be reversed, the 
Oneworld airlines must adopt a more aggressive strategy for membership expansion. This 
chapter provides an analysis of potential options for growing partnership opportunities.  
6.1 Multi-goal Analysis 
A multi-goal analysis will be used to evaluate specific strategic options for 
growing Oneworld partnership opportunities. The model to be used was developed by 
Aidan Vining and Lindsay Meredith (2000). Their approach requires five steps: 1) 
generate a set of strategic options; 2) select a set of goals, against which to evaluate the 
strategic options; 3) predict the impact of the strategic options in terms of the selected 
goals; 4) value the predicted impacts in terms of the set of goals over the complete set of 
strategic options; 5) evaluate the complete set of strategic options in terms of the 
complete set of goals.  
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6.1.1 Strategic Options for Growing Alliance Partnership Opportunities 
The first step in the multi-goal analysis is to generate a set of strategic options. 
The following four options will be considered for growing the number of partnership 
opportunities available to the Oneworld members: 1) pursue traditional network airlines 
that are not already alliance members; 2) partner with LCCs; 3) invite SCCs to join the 
alliance; and 4) poach partners from other alliances, through mergers and foreign direct 
investment. 
The first option is to pursue any remaining non-allied network airlines. These full 
service airlines tend to fit the traditional mould of alliance partners. Malaysian Airlines is 
a good example. The airline has a very good product and meets all of the traditional 
requirements to be an alliance member. Its hub at Kuala Lumpur International Airport 
would be a good fit for Oneworld, which needs to expand its network in Asia. Other 
traditional non-allied airlines could include Hainan Airlines (China) and Gulf Air 
(Bahrain). This strategy would continue the status quo of recruiting traditional network 
airlines that are not already a member of an alliance. 
A second option for partnership growth could come from LCCs. There is already 
a trend of alliances establishing partnerships with LCCs. Oneworld‘s announcement in 
2010 that Air Berlin was joining the alliance is the most prominent example. Air Berlin 
unabashedly claims its position as an alternative service model (CAPA Article, March 
2011). The airline is considered to be an LCC but its product offering is at the high end of 
the model. The carrier describes itself as "offering a high product quality combined with 
above-average service, while still keeping prices low‖ (CAPA report, March 2011). This 
allows Air Berlin to position itself between traditional network airlines and typical LCCs. 
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Several other examples of airlines at the upper end of the LCC business model include 
Westjet Airlines (Canada), Jet Blue (Eastern United States), Jetstar (Australia/Asia) and 
GOL Airlines (Brazil). This strategy would target those airlines that position themselves 
between typical LCCs and traditional network airlines. 
A third consideration for expanding partnership opportunities is to extend 
invitations to the SCCs. Emirates, Qatar Airways and Etihad Airlines are the three 
available options within this strategy. These airlines have so far opted to remain 
independent of global alliances. They are strategically located in the Middle East and are 
continuing to expand rapidly. This strategy would involve selecting one of the three 
airlines as a partner. Given the close proximity of each airline and their overlapping 
routes networks, it is unlikely that more than one SCC would fit within a single alliance. 
Mergers and foreign direct investment are the final option to be considered for 
expanding partnership opportunities. The list of non-allied network airlines has shrunk. 
However, the potential exists for poaching members from other alliance groupings 
through this option. A good example of this occurred in 2008 with the merger between 
United and Continental Airlines. Continental was a member of Skyteam prior to this date, 
while United was a Star Alliance member. Following the merger with United, 
Continental quickly defected to the Star Alliance (Businessweek, June 2008). The United 
and Continental merger also drove Copa Airlines to leave Skyteam. The airline, based out 
of Panama City, has strong partnership ties with Continental. It was therefore no surprise 
that Copa announced its intent to join the Star Alliance in 2010 (Star Alliance press 
release, November 2010). The example of United, Continental and Copa serves to 
illustrate that airline mergers could play a large role in re-shaping the global alliance 
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landscape moving forward. This strategy would involve the Oneworld partner airlines 
looking for opportunities to poach airlines from existing alliances when merger or foreign 
direct investment opportunities arise. 
6.1.2 Evaluation Criteria 
The second step in developing the multi-goal analysis is to identify evaluation 
criteria. A set of goals is required to assist in evaluating the four network growth options 
discussed above. The following goals are applied to the analysis: 1) maximizing network 
size; 2) improving quality of service; 3) minimizing internal partner conflict and 4) the 
ability for Oneworld to implement new partnership agreements quickly. 
The first goal is maximization of network size. The benefits of an extensive 
alliance network were detailed in Chapter 4. A larger network of partnerships can lead to 
improved pricing, reduced costs, increased willingness to pay and a reduction in industry 
rivalry. Each of these will result in an increased ability for airlines to create and capture 
value. This is clearly an important consideration for the Oneworld partners if they are to 
maximize profits from their alliance. 
The second goal is improved quality of service. This is important in ensuring that 
the Oneworld partners are able to increase willingness to pay for business travellers. 
Adding alliance members can potentially dilute the quality of service offered by an 
alliance. This is often true for partnerships with airlines from emerging markets, where 
consistency of products can be problematic. A recent example was referenced in a report 
by the Centre for Pacific Aviation, with a less than enthusiastic review of Skyteam‘s 
invitation to Saudi Arabian Airlines. The carrier has a number of unusual characteristics 
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that make it a challenging fit for alliance consistency. For example, it is fully owned by 
the government and entry and transit are both complicated by tight and expensive visa 
requirements. The nation and its national carrier, also do not have good reputations for 
their policies towards women and other groups. These two factors considerably 
complicate the use of its hubs as alliance transit points. The absence of alcohol and other 
state-imposed restrictions also reduce the airline‘s appeal for business travellers. The 
decision by Skyteam to invite Saudi Arabian airlines serves to illustrate the difficulty in 
maintaining a standard product among members (CAPA report, January 2011). The 
question this raises for the global alliances is: how much are the groups willing to accept 
service differentiation in attempts to extend their opportunities for partnerships? 
Additionally, as was shown in Chapter 4, alliance partners must position themselves to 
deliver exceptional services if they are to extract premiums on interline fares from 
business travellers. Dilution of standards for membership could result in a decreased 
ability to increase customer willingness to pay and reduce an airline‘s ability to create 
and capture value from their alliance partnerships. Consideration must therefore be given 
to the impact any new member will have on improving quality of service before an 
invitation is extended. 
Alliances must also be careful to minimize inter-alliance conflict when a new 
member is invited to join. The addition of new members raises the potential for overlap 
and conflict between partners. This is due to the fact that new partners may fly routes that 
overlap with existing partners. If a new partner were to generate significant inter-alliance 
conflict, the negatives may outweigh the benefits of adding that airline to the group. 
These concerns can be reduced in situations where ATI is approved by regulators 
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amongst partners. The granting of ATI enables partners to cooperate on routes by 
aligning schedules and sharing revenues, which reduces industry rivalry. However, if 
immunities do not exist, so-called partners can end up competing against each other 
within the same alliance. In some cases, this can be detrimental to the alliance group. 
Consideration must therefore be placed on minimizing internal conflict when an airline is 
invited to join the alliance. 
The last goal for consideration is the ability to implement a strategy quickly. This 
is an important consideration in the alliance environment where a strong first mover 
advantage exists. Once an airline commits to an alliance, it is rare that they defect. It is 
therefore important that efforts are prioritized so that constrained management resources 
can be dedicated to strategies that are realistic and quick to implement. If a strategy has a 
number of factors that will delay implementation for several years, it is likely an 
alternative option would be given preference. The multi-goal analysis will take into 
account speed of implementation. 
6.1.2.1 Weighting of Evaluation Criteria 
The final step in establishing evaluation criteria is to provide a relative weighting 
for each goal. It is often the case that a firm will place different levels of importance on 
each of its goals. However, for the purpose of this analysis it has been assumed that each 
strategic goal is of equal importance to the Oneworld member airlines. The reason for 
this is each member airline within the Oneworld alliance has its own unique corporate 
strategy. It is likely that each member would value the four goals differently. For 
simplicity, it is assumed that the Oneworld alliance partners place equal value on each of 
the four goals: maximize network size, maintain a consistent quality of service, minimize 
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internal partner conflict and the ability for Oneworld to implement new partnerships 
quickly. Each of the four goals will therefore be equally weighted at 25% of total utility. 
6.1.3 Multi-goal Analysis Matrix 
The next step in the multi-goal analysis is to consider each of the four strategic 
options for growing alliance partnership opportunities against the goals discussed above. 
In completing this exercise a score from 1-5 is assigned to rank the effectiveness of each 
alternative in achieving the defined goals. The following scale has been used for the 
analysis. 
Figure 7: Relative weighting for strategic options 
1 2 3 4 5 
Low Medium High 
Source: Author 
Table 3 provides a summary of the multi-goal strategic analysis for growing the 
Oneworld network.  
  45 
Table 3: Multi-goal analysis for Oneworld network growth 
  Options for Partnership Growth 
 
 (A1) 
Traditional  
(A2) 
LCCs 
(A3) 
SCCs 
(A4) 
Mergers 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 G
o
a
ls
 
(G1) Maximize network size Low-
Medium 
2 
Medium-
High  
4 
Medium-
High  
4 
High  
5 
(G2) Improved quality of service Medium-
High  
4 
Low -
Medium 
2 
High  
4 
Medium 
3 
(G3) Minimize partner conflict Medium-
High  
4 
High  
5 
Low  
1 
Medium-
High  
4 
(G4) Ability to implement 
quickly 
High  
5 
Medium  
3 
Low 
1 
Low 
1 
 Sum of Utilities 15 14 10 13 
Source: Author 
The following section details the rationale for the cumulative scores that have been 
assigned to each option for increasing Oneworld‘s partnership opportunities. 
6.1.3.1 Expansion through traditional network airlines 
The first option is to grow partnership opportunities through the recruitment of 
traditional network airlines. This strategy scores highly in improving quality service and 
in ability to implement partners quickly. Non-allied network airlines are the most natural 
fit for alliance membership. They tend to meet the profile for a standard partner. These 
airlines offer full service products that are in line with the requirements that Oneworld 
traditionally has sought in alliance partners. It is therefore likely that passengers on 
Oneworld flights would be satisfied with the services delivered.  
  46 
These airlines would also be relatively easy to add to the alliance, given that they 
are used to having partnerships with other airlines and would already meet a majority of 
the Oneworld requirements for membership. Target airlines could include Malaysian, 
Hainan and Gulf Air. Each would fit well with Oneworld‘s positioning as the quality 
airline alliance.  
However, the strategy ranks low in maximizing network size. The reason for this 
is there are simply too few network airline options remaining to sizably grow the 
Oneworld network. The fact is there are not a lot of traditional network airlines available 
to alliances in most regions (CAPA, July 2010). Even if Oneworld were successful in 
recruiting Malaysian, Hainan and Gulf Air, it would add only 35 million total passengers 
to the network on an annual basis (IATA report, 2009). As of January 2011, the 
Oneworld partner airlines combined to carry 36 billion passengers on an annual basis 
(source: oneworld.com). The addition of these three airlines would therefore grow the 
Oneworld network by only 10% annually. As will be demonstrated below, this is a 
relatively small figure compared to other options for expanding alliance partnership 
opportunities. The total utility generated for traditional network airlines is scored at 15. 
This strategy would rank much higher if there were a wider pool of candidates. 
6.1.3.2 Expansion through LCCs 
The second alternative is inviting LCCs to join the alliance. This option scores 
high in maximizing network size and minimizing partner conflict. This is due to the fact 
that there are a lot of potential LCC candidates that do not currently compete directly 
with existing Oneworld alliance members. LCCs tend to be regionally focused so do not 
compete on international routes, which is the focus of a majority of the Oneworld partner 
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route strategies. These airlines have also traditionally not been approached by alliances 
for membership. This is due to the fact that they do not fit the model of a traditional 
alliance partner.  
The alternative business model adopted by LCCs is also the reason that this 
option scores poorly in improving quality of service. This low score results from the 
relatively stripped down products delivered by LCCs. For example, the lack of business 
and first class cabins on LCCs creates a service delivery gap for business travellers. 
These passengers would need to transfer from a full service flight, with business or first 
class seats, over to an LCC flight that offers only one cabin of service. This should be a 
concern for the Oneworld partners who are already experiencing difficulties in extracting 
service premiums from their interline flights (as discussed in Chapter 4).  
However, concerns of quality of service may not be a legitimate reason to exclude 
this option. LCCs typically service domestic and regional routes that do not involve long 
flight durations. Customers are already used to flying on smaller airplanes with lower 
service levels when travelling on short routes. Many full service airlines have reduced 
their service offerings for flights within Europe and on domestic routes in the United 
States in an effort to cut costs. In many cases it could be argued that the products 
provided by LCCs are superior to the products offered by traditional network airlines on 
short or domestic flights (source: Author‘s experience). LCCs could therefore potentially 
fulfill the role of domestic and regional feeders for alliances moving forward, with 
minimal impact to customer satisfaction.  
The option also scores relatively low in ability to implement quickly. This is again 
due to the alternative business model adopted by LCCs. The simple business models of 
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these airlines have not historically involved establishing interline partnerships with other 
airlines. This is a new phenomenon which introduces a level of complexity that LCCs 
previously did not participate in. However, a growing number of LCCs are beginning to 
focus on attracting business travellers and this is resulting in adjustments to their 
strategies. In a recent interview Greg Saretsky, Westjet‘s CEO, advised that the company 
has traditionally focused on leisure travellers but its future growth depends on attracting 
business travellers. The airline is therefore boosting routes in the Toronto-Ottawa-
Montreal triangle (key business traveller routes), offering a rewards program and 
introducing more flexible fares. Westjet is also starting to establish partnership 
agreements. The airline recently sold their first ticket on American Airlines. Saretsky 
commented "We are beginning to capture traffic that we would have never seen in our 
own network. And all of that over time will add tens of millions of dollars" (The Calgary 
Herald, March 2011). This is precisely the benefit the Oneworld partners could bring to 
Westjet and other LCCs. The relationship with American Airlines could be extended to 
other Oneworld airlines that service Canada. 
In addition to Westjet, several other LCCs that could benefit the Oneworld 
network are Jet Blue (Eastern United States), Jetstar (Australia/Asia) and GOL Airlines 
(Brazil). These airlines all provide products at the high end of the LCC model and would 
add significantly to the Oneworld network. Oneworld currently has network gaps in each 
of these countries and regions. The four airlines would add approximately 70 million 
passengers to the Oneworld network on an annual basis. This would increase annual 
Oneworld passengers by 21% annually. The total utility for LCCs has been scored at 14, 
largely do to significant potential they bring for maximizing network size. 
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6.1.3.3 Expansion through SCCs 
Expansion of partnership opportunities through the recruitment of SCCs scores 
high in a number of areas. Emirates, Qatar Airways and Etihad Airlines fit the alliance 
model in terms of product delivery. The airlines offer excellent services that are in line 
with, or exceed, the products delivered by existing Oneworld members. These high 
quality products could significantly assist in improving quality of service. These airlines 
could also add significant volumes of passengers to the Oneworld network. For example, 
the addition of Emirates would add 25 million scheduled passengers to the Oneworld 
network on an annual basis (IATA report, 2009). This would be an increase of 7% in 
annual passengers for the Oneworld network through the addition of a single airline.  
However, SCCs score poorly in minimizing conflict amongst Oneworld partner 
airlines. The SCCs have network strategies that would create significant overlap with 
core alliance partners. Due to their strategically located hubs (Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and 
Doha), each airline is positioned to provide direct service to cities on six different 
continents (Deutsche Bank report, p. 80). This would create dramatic overlap with core 
airlines within Oneworld, including British Airways and Cathay Pacific. As an example, 
these Oneworld members compete heavily with SCCs for traffic originating from the 
Indian subcontinent. British Airways and Cathay Pacific move these passengers through 
their respective hubs in London and Hong Kong. Emirates, Etihad and Qatar are 
competing for the same passenger base through their Middle Eastern hubs. This inter-
alliance conflict would likely be very detrimental to existing members.  
A second issue is an inability to implement alliance agreements with SCCs 
quickly. To date, these airlines have not expressed interest in joining the alliance groups. 
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The CEO of Emirates, Tim Clark, has publicly stated that the airline would not enter into 
any global alliance as they are harmful to competitiveness (alrroya.com, October 2010). 
The fact is that Emirates, Qatar and Etihad are neither interested in alliance membership 
nor a welcome partner. This results in low scores for both reducing member conflict and 
for ability to implement quickly. The total utility for SCCs is scored at 10. 
6.1.3.4 Expansion through mergers and foreign direct investment 
The final option to be considered is growth through mergers. This membership 
acquisition strategy could enable Oneworld to poach airlines from Star Alliance and 
Skyteam. Two examples of potential significant opportunities have recently been 
reported by various media outlets. These include an opportunity for foreign direct 
investment in China Eastern, based in Shanghai (Skyteam), and an opportunity for a 
Oneworld alliance member to merge with TAM Airlines, based in São Paulo (Star 
Alliance).  
The prospect of engaging China Eastern with foreign direct investment has 
recently been raised in the press. Oneworld members, British Airways and Iberia, are 
currently in the process of merging. In creating their new operating structure, the two 
companies have established an umbrella organization called International Airlines 
Consolidation Group (IACG). Willie Walsh, the CEO of IACG, has stated that the new 
company is looking beyond synergies between British Airways and Iberia. He explained: 
―IACG is not about putting BA and Iberia together. It is about creating a platform to 
create a carrier of global scale‖ (Taylor, July 2010). The model enables airlines to 
maintain their individual brands under the umbrella group but to drive operational 
synergies through schedule alignment and other areas. The IACG group has earmarked 
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Asia as a key region for expansion once their own merger completes. Analysts view 
Chinese carriers as willing recipients of foreign investment. Specifically, Liu Shaoyong, 
the Chairman of China Eastern, has courted outside investment (eTurbo news, September 
2010). This potentially opens the door for Oneworld to gain a partner in China, where the 
alliance is currently at a distinct disadvantage to its alliance rivals. China Eastern would 
add 45 million passengers to the Oneworld network annually, an increase of 13% in 
annual alliance passengers. 
A second example is occurring in Latin America with the attempted merger 
between Chile's LAN Airlines Group and Brazil's TAM. This deal would create Latin 
America's biggest carrier, if cleared by regulators. The merger would have a large impact 
on the global alliances. LAN is a Oneworld partner, whereas TAM is a Star Alliance 
member. The alliance that successfully woos this merged company will have a 
commanding lead in the Latin America air travel market. Oscar Garcia, the Chair of 
Interflight Global, who regularly briefs analysts on the Latin American air transport 
market, believes it will be Oneworld that is successful. ―Everything LAN today is, in 
large measure, thanks to Oneworld,‖ said Garcia. ―I really doubt they would go to Star. 
TAM is Star Alliance, but only since May 2010, but that is nothing compared to LAN‘s 
founding membership in Oneworld. Should it stay with Oneworld, then Oneworld will be 
the dominant alliance in Latin America‖ (CAPA article, November 2010). TAM would 
introduce 27 million passengers to the Oneworld network annually (IATA report, 2009), 
an increase of 8% in annual passenger traffic. 
The strategy of partnership growth through mergers and foreign direct investment 
scores poorly in quickness to implement. As discussed in chapter 3, cross-border mergers 
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in the airline industry are complicated by regulatory restrictions on foreign ownership. 
The ability for Oneworld members to utilize this strategy to increase partnership 
opportunities is therefore dependent on decisions by various regulatory bodies. It is 
positive news that aviation regulators appear to be relaxing industry restrictions. Over the 
past two decades, the introduction of Open Skies agreements, the creation of the EU‘s 
Single Aviation Market, more extensive granting of antitrust immunities and relaxation of 
foreign ownership restrictions have all reduced the restrictive regulations that have 
previously prevented cross-border mergers (Deutsche Bank report, p. 3). If these 
deregulation trends continue, this strategy offers significant potential for the Oneworld 
members to address the threats they face. The total utility for expanding partnership 
opportunities through the acquisition of China Easter and TAM airlines through mergers 
is scored at 13 but would be significantly higher if trends continue and the regulatory 
environment continues to relax foreign ownership restrictions. 
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7:  RECOMENDATIONS 
Chapter 6 applied a multi-goal analysis to four strategic options for increasing 
partnership opportunities for the Oneworld airlines. These options are not mutually 
exclusive. In principle, they could all be taken at the same time. However, management 
resource constraints and desirability of potential members must be considered in 
prioritizing efforts. This chapter recommends that the Oneworld partners proceed with 
strategies to increase alliance membership through three options: 1) pursue non-allied 
traditional network airlines, 2) invite LCC partners and 3) take advantage of merger and 
foreign direct investment opportunities when they arise. It is not recommend that SCCs 
be pursued for alliance membership. Additionally, this chapter will reiterate that simply 
growing the alliance network is not enough to ensure value is driven through 
partnerships. Deep alliance relationships are required if value is to be maximized. It is 
therefore recommended that the Oneworld members complement their membership drive 
with a continued emphasis on gaining ATIs and establishing JBs on routes where 
immunities have been granted. 
7.1 Increased Partnership Opportunities 
The Oneworld partners must grow their alliance network if they are to reverse the 
trend of diminishing passenger numbers and ensure that partnership opportunities are not 
further reduced. They should do this by engaging in an aggressive membership 
recruitment drive. The immediate focus should be on actively pursuing any remaining 
non-allied traditional network airlines. This list should include Malaysian, Gulf Air and 
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Hainan. Given the small pool of non-allied traditional network airlines, a second 
immediate focus should be on recruiting non-traditional alliance airlines. This should 
include efforts to attract airlines that are at the upper-end of the LCC model. The 
recommended targets are Jet Blue, Westjet, Gol and Jetstar. It is recognized that these 
partners may impact the consistency of product service levels. However, these airlines 
will largely fulfill the role of domestic and regional feeder flights where passengers are 
already conditioned to not expect a full service offering. 
An additional, longer term, membership expansion strategy should be to look for 
opportunities to poach network airlines from other alliances through mergers and foreign 
direct investment. China Eastern (Shanghai) and TAM Airlines (São Paulo) should be 
targeted. This strategy is admittedly complicated by the regulatory environment. 
Government hurdles exist but the regulatory landscape in many jurisdictions is changing. 
Governments are beginning to relax foreign ownership restrictions. If these trends 
continue, it will open a significant opportunity for the Oneworld partners to address the 
threats it faces, particularly in emerging markets like Brazil and China. 
7.2 Deepen Alliance Partnerships through Joint Businesses 
Any growth in alliance membership should be complemented by a focus on 
deepening alliance relationships. Deep levels of partnership are often required if 
maximum value is to be created and captured through alliance relationships. As Chapter 2 
discussed, the ability for airlines to form deep partnerships is often dependent on ATI. 
ATI enables partner airlines to align flight schedules and integrate in ways that would 
otherwise be deemed as collusive. As was discussed in Chapter 5, Oneworld has been 
operating at a distinct disadvantage against the competition in terms of ATI approvals on 
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key routes. However, Oneworld has made progress in this area. Figure 8 provides an 
updated summary of immunities between alliances following the granting of Oneworld‘s 
ATIs on North Atlantic and Pacific routes in October 2010. 
Figure 8: ATI between alliance partners post October 2010 
 
Source: Author 
Oneworld must continue to work with government regulators in an effort to have 
ATI approved between partners on key routes. For example, American Airlines and 
Qantas Airways recently announced that an application will be submitted to the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) for immunity between the 
two partners on Transpacific routes (eTurbo News, March 2011). Oneworld should 
follow up the Transpacific filing by seeking to obtain ATI between Asia and the South 
Pacific and between Asia and Europe.  
Additionally, Oneworld should continue to be aggressive in establishing JBs on 
routes where ATI has been granted. As was discussed in Chapter 2, JBs set the 
foundation for shared interests and deeper integration by creating an environment where 
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partner airlines share revenues on immunized routes. This reduces industry rivalry 
dramatically. Rather than competing against one another, alliance partners are 
encouraged to work together to maximize joint profits. The Oneworld partners should 
maximize the value of ATIs by establishing JBs wherever ATIs have been approved. An 
important example exists between American Airlines and LAN Airlines on routes from 
North America to Latin America. The two partners have enjoyed ATI on these routes for 
several years but have not created a JB (source: Author‘s experience). This leaves the two 
partners as competitors on these immunized routes and therefore does not take full 
advantage of the opportunity to remove rivalry. 
It is recognized that this recommendation is very dependent on external 
influences. The granting of ATIs is reliant on decisions from various regulatory bodies. It 
is not simply a decision that can be made by the Oneworld partners. However, the 
member airlines can influence decision making. Resources can be dedicated to lobbying 
regulators who grant immunities. As an example, it took American Airlines and British 
Airways fifteen years and four applications to the US DOT and EU regulators to receive 
approval for ATI on their transatlantic routes (source: author‘s experience). This would 
not have happened had the two partners not been persistent and willing to devote 
resources to the effort. It is recommended that the Oneworld members continue efforts to 
gain ATI on key routes and proceed with establishing JBs between partners wherever 
ATI has been granted. This will ensure that the maximum value is created and captured 
through alliance partnerships. 
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8:  CONCLUSION 
The alliance strategy employed by the Oneworld partners has led to strengths and 
weaknesses. Selective choice of partners has enabled the group to maintain a consistent 
product and service level. The downside of the strategy is the number of passengers 
flown by the Oneworld partners on an annual basis has fallen behind the competition and 
is decreasing on an annual basis, while the Star Alliance and Skyteam networks continue 
to grow annually. A smaller membership base is threatening to reduce opportunities for 
Oneworld members to establish valuable interline partnerships. Additionally, Oneworld 
is not well positioned in key growth regions for air travel. The alliance has no clear 
strategy for addressing network gaps in Asia and other emerging markets.  
Oneworld should develop an aggressive, focussed strategy to network expansion. 
In the short term, this strategy should focus on recruiting any remaining non-allied 
network airlines. The short term strategy should also target airlines at the high end of the 
LCC spectrum. In the longer term, Oneworld should proactively target strategically 
important airlines through merger and foreign direct investment opportunities, two 
examples include China Eastern and TAM airlines. In addition, Oneworld should 
continue to deepen alliance relationships with existing members through the pursuit of 
ATI and the establishment of JBs. The application by American Airlines and Qantas 
Airways for ATI between North America and Australia should be followed by similar 
applications between Asia and both Australia and Europe. The combination of a larger 
alliance network and deeper partner integration would deliver the primary objective of 
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alliance membership, which is enhanced profits through increased customer willingness 
to pay and reduced costs for member airlines. 
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